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Philosophy of Mind and Body in Andrei Tarkovsky's Solaris

V. Tumanov

October 28, 2016 DOI: 10.3366/film.2016.0020 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Hari's status as a person is best examined through competing philosophical accounts of memory, personal identity, and mind, and asks whether she should be reduced to her alien structure or understood through her behavior. The paper contends that these questions carry moral implications for human sociality, emotional response, and the role of the body in the human condition.

Abstract

Andrei Tarkovsky's film Solaris (1972) is studied through the lens of philosophy of mind. The question of memory and personhood, as developed by John Locke and then expanded by Derek Parfit, is applied to the status of Hari – the copy of the protagonist's deceased wife. The key question addressed by this paper is on what basis Hari can (or should?) be considered human. Hari's personhood is further analyzed in the context of Cartesian dualism, the response to Descartes by reductionism and the rebuttal of reductionism by the functionalist theories of Hilary Putnam. Descartes' thoughts on animal suffering and the bete-machine are pitted against Hari's experience in Solaris. The key question is whether Hari can be reduced to her alien structure or should be considered in terms of her behavior. The moral implications of these questions are extended to human sociality, human emotional response and the role of the body in the human condition.

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