Mechanistic explanation, cognitive systems demarcation, and extended cognition.
Dingmar Van Eck, Huib Looren de Jong
Studies in history and philosophy of science October 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.05.002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive systems demarcation Extended cognition Externalism Internalism Mechanistic explanation |
| Key points | Argues that the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, extended with the criterion of 'fat-handedness', can plausibly address the cognitive systems demarcation problem and decide the explanatory traction of internalist versus externalist conceptions on a case-by-case basis. The authors contend that explanation-oriented approaches need not be abandoned in favor of improved metaphysics, and illustrate their claims with a case on gestures and learning. |
Abstract
Approaches to the Internalism-Externalism controversy in the philosophy of mind often involve both (broadly) metaphysical and explanatory considerations. Whereas originally most emphasis seems to have been placed on metaphysical concerns, recently the explanation angle is getting more attention. Explanatory considerations promise to offer more neutral grounds for cognitive systems demarcation than (broadly) metaphysical ones. However, it has been argued that explanation-based approaches are incapable of determining the plausibility of internalist-based conceptions of cognition vis-à-vis externalist ones. On this perspective, improved metaphysics is the route along which to solve the Internalist-Externalist stalemate. In this paper we challenge this claim. Although we agree that explanation-orientated approaches have indeed so far failed to deliver solid means for cognitive system demarcation, we elaborate a more promising explanation-oriented framework to address this issue. We argue that the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, extended with the criterion of 'fat-handedness', is capable of plausibly addressing the cognitive systems demarcation problem, and thus able to decide on the explanatory traction of Internalist vs. Externalist conceptions, on a case-by-case basis. Our analysis also highlights why some other recent mechanistic takes on the problem of cognitive systems demarcation have been unsuccessful. We illustrate our claims with a case on gestures and learning.