Schizophrenia and Selfhood
Real Hallucinations September 15, 2017 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036719.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes a refined account of the minimal self in which it centrally involves a grasp of the modalities of intentionality, and argues that certain anomalous experiences involve disturbances of this modal structure. Also considers an alternative account of auditory verbal hallucinations as diagnostically non-specific, meaningful symptoms of interpersonal trauma, and suggests the minimal self may be developmentally and constitutively dependent on ways of relating to other people. |
Abstract
This chapter introduces some of the central concepts, themes, and issues addressed in the book. First of all, it discusses the concept of ‘minimal self’ and its recent application to schizophrenia and auditory verbal hallucination (AVH). Then it raises the question of whether minimal self includes only the sense of having some kind of experience or, in addition, a more specific sense of the type of intentional state one is in. A refined account of minimal self is proposed, according to which it centrally involves the latter: a grasp of the modalities of intentionality. It is further argued that certain anomalous experiences centrally involve disturbances of modal structure. Following this, the chapter considers an alternative account of AVHs, according to which they are diagnostically non-specific, meaningful symptoms of interpersonal trauma. In so doing, it stresses the need to place more emphasis on the interpersonal aspects of psychiatric illness, and shows how minimal self, as conceived of here, could turn out to be both developmentally and constitutively dependent on ways of relating to other people.