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Pragmatic Encroachment, Phenomenology, and Religious Experience

Michael D. Barber

Religions July 21, 2022 DOI: 10.3390/rel13070669 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Rizzieri's pragmatic encroachment account of religious belief can be strengthened by Alfred Schutz's theory of action, which preserves evidentialism within a theoretical enclave, and by Husserlian regional ontologies and bipolar intentionality. Proposes that Max Scheler's account of religious experience could provide evidence for religious knowledge and counter the reduction of religious experience to subjective projection.

Abstract

Aaron Rizzieri’s Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief, andPractice (2013) is the fullest religious appropriation of a relatively new epistemological concept: pragmatic encroachment. To achieve this goal, Rizzieri rightly sees (1) how justification takes place within an encompassing pragmatic context and (2) how justification of religious belief establishes within a wider context less than absolute knowledge. While the first point can be supported by Alfred Schutz’s theory of action, often including multi-layered sub-acts, Schutz’s idea of a theoretical enclave can create a space for epistemic evidentialism, as an independent distinctive moment, with distinctive (justificatory) purposes, within an overarching practical action. Rizzieri’s book itself exemplifies such evidentialism, theoretically justifying pragmatic encroachment, after the fashion of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Rizzieri could also profit from Husserlian regional ontologies, on which he implicitly already relies to support religious knowledge. Husserl’s concept of bipolar intentionality would accommodate Rizzieri’s responsible internalism, while allowing for the action of objects upon us. This, in turn, opens the door to the evidence for religious knowledge that an account of religious experience such as Max Scheler’s could provide. Such an account could counter those who reduce religious experience to mere subjective projection—a critique to which internalism might be more vulnerable.

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