Explaining consciousness: From correlations to foundations
Wolfgang Prinz
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2016 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x1500223x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that efficient functional explanations of consciousness and action require two epistemological conditions: independent description of explanandum and explanans, and a foundational explanation of their mutual relationship. Contends that Morsella et al.'s target article does not fully satisfy these requirements. |
Abstract
Abstract: What does it take to explain the roles of consciousness for action and action for consciousness? This commentary claims that efficient functional explanations must meet two epistemological requirements: independent description of explanandum and explanans, and foundational explanation of their mutual relationship. It is argued that Morsella et al.'s target articledoes not fully meet these requirements.