Personal Identity, Functionalism and the Extended Mind☆
Marius M. Stanciu
April 22, 2014 DOI: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.03.259 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that, on a functionalist version of the psychological continuity view of personal identity, extended mind is currently impossible but might be possible in the future, and contends that functionalism gives an optimistic picture of our psychological persistence conditions. |
Abstract
Abstract In the last thirty years, advancements made in neurobiology and computer science have profoundly changed the ways in which we conceive and regard ourselves. Within this context, metaphysical questions about personal identity become intertwined with real, practical concerns and ethical considerations. In this paper we will examine the extended mind thesis ( Clark & Chalmers, 1998 ) and what it entails for personal identity. Adopting a psychological continuity view restated in functionalist terms, we conclude that mind extension is currently impossible, but might be possible in the future. Ultimately, we maintain that functionalism paints a very optimistic picture about our psychological persistence conditions.