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A defense of Buddhist virtue ethics

Jack Hamblin, Matthew Mackenzie, Katie McShane, Christian Becker

Digital Collections of Colorado 2018 DOI: 10.25675/3.023591 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Citations 1
Key points Argues that Buddhist ethics is most reasonably interpreted as virtue ethics, and proposes an account of Buddhist virtue ethics built on the four noble truths, meditation, the four immeasurable virtues, and emotion regulation. Contends that this virtue ethical interpretation is compatible with a non-Western approach.

Abstract

In Chapter 1, I describe necessary dimensions of Buddhist ethics. I comment on and argue for the inclusion of the four noble truths, meditation, the four immeasurable virtues, and regulating emotion. In Chapter 2, I establish the viability of virtue ethics. I review virtue ethics from an historical perspective, look at and answer a critique of the virtues, and distinguish my version of virtue ethics from consequentialism and deontology. In Chapter 3, I defend Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics. I argue that a virtue ethical interpretation of Buddhism is the most reasonable of the Western interpretations, that a virtue ethical interpretation is compatible with a non-Western approach, and finally implement the necessary dimensions from the first chapter to put forward a plausible account of Buddhist virtue ethics.

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