Dos teorías informacionales de la conciencia
Diego Llontop
Persona December 11, 2017 DOI: 10.26439/persona2017.n20.1744 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that two information-based accounts of consciousness diverge: Ortiz holds that information is a material structure shaping the cerebral cortex and configuring consciousness, while Chalmers holds that information is an "abstract space" that is non-material but physically realizable and could explain consciousness's ineffable character. Both are framed as responses to the apparent insufficiency of classical materialism for the phenomenological aspect of consciousness. |
Abstract
The paper presents two theories that seek to explain consciousness on the basis of the concept of information. Ortiz understands information as a material structure that shapes the human cerebral cortex, thus configuring consciousness, while Chalmers considers information as an “abstract space” not material but realizable in the physical, therefore, an element that could explain the ineffable character of consciousness. Both perspectives appear in a theoretical context in which classical materialism as hegemonic scientific image of the world shows an apparent insufficiency to account for the phenomenological aspect of consciousness.