On the existence of qualia
Boran Berić
Papers on Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology and Pedagogy April 23, 2018 DOI: 10.15291/radovifpsp.2626 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Daniel Dennett's case for eliminating qualia—the qualitative properties of conscious experience—is not conclusive, challenging Dennett's eliminative materialist claim that the concept is incoherent and should be abandoned. |
Abstract
The notion of qualia (as qualitative Properties of our conscious expe- riences) is introduced through discussion of Daniel Dennett's Paper »Qui- ning qualia«, where Dennett tries to show that the traditional concept of qualia is so thoroughly confused, arguing that it should be completely abandoned. Choosing the eliminative materialist's position, he denies the existence of qualia as mental properties. The Author's intention is to show that Dennett’s arguments for denying the existence of qualia are, at least, not conclusive.