Animal Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts
July 6, 2017 DOI: 10.4324/9781315742250-19 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that higher-order thought (HOT) theory is consistent with animal consciousness, while acknowledging the potentially damaging claim that HOT theory requires prefrontal cortex activity for conscious states. Distinguishes HOT from higher-order perception (HOP) theories and notes the standard reply that a higher-order thought accompanying a first-order conscious state is not itself conscious unless a further higher-order thought targets it. |
Abstract
This chapter introduces the more general problem of other minds with respect to animals. It provide a brief sketch of representationalism, which is the theory of consciousness that the higher-order thought (HOT) theory falls under in the standard taxonomy. The chapter details HOT theory and presents evidence in favor of the view that HOT theory is consistent with animal consciousness. It also presents the potentially damaging claim that HOT theory requires neural activity in the prefrontal cortex in order for one to have conscious states. There are various kinds of HOR theory, with the most common division between HOT theories and higher-order perception (HOP) theories. The standard and widely accepted reply is that when a conscious mental state is a first-order world-directed conscious state, the higher-order thought (HOT) is not itself conscious. But when the HOT is itself conscious, there is a yet higher-order thought directed at the second-order state.