William James and the Embodied Mind
Lana Kühle
Contemporary Pragmatism May 30, 2017 DOI: 10.1163/18758185-01401004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that the hard problem of consciousness can be addressed through an embodied mind view, specifically William James' theory of emotions, in which emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily states. Proposes that interoception explains how the biological body gives rise to bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness. |
Abstract
The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily states. Through James’ account, I show how the biological body can give rise to a bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness, and thus move towards a solution of the hard problem.