Making Sense of Phenomenological Sense-Making: On Moore on Husserl
David R. Cerbone
July 1, 2015 DOI: 10.5840/philtopics2015431/217 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Moore's worries about a gap between natural and phenomenological sense-making echo Fink's radical reading of Husserl in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, and that this gap makes it unclear whether phenomenological sense-making can make sense of ordinary sense-making, or whether we can make sense of that kind of sense-making at all. |
Abstract
This paper examines Moore’s account of Husserl in chapter 17 of The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics. I consider in particular the threat of a gap between natural sense-making, which takes place within what Husserl calls the “natural attitude,” and phenomenological sense-making, which is made from within the perspective afforded by the phenomenological reduction. Moore’s concerns are an echo, I suggest, of the radical account of Husserlian phenomenology developed by Husserl’s student and final assistant, Eugen Fink, in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation. Fink’s account shows just how wide a gap there is between natural and phenomenological sense-making. Given that gap, I argue that it is not clear whether phenomenological sense-making really can make sense of natural or ordinary sense-making, nor is it clear that we can even make sense of that kind of sense-making at all.