William James’s naturalistic account of concepts and his ‘Rejection of Logic’ 1
Henry Jackman
July 6, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9780429508134-8 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that William James's naturalistic understanding of concepts, most explicit in The Principles of Psychology, underlies his apparent rejection of logic and robust truth, a stance contemporaries often dismissed as irrational and motivated by a desire to make room for religion. |
Abstract
William James was one of the most controversial philosophers of the early part of the twentieth century, and his apparent skepticism about logic and any robust conception of truth was often simply attributed to his endorsing mysticism and irrationality out of an overwhelming desire to make room for religion in his world-view. James&s;s naturalistic understanding of concepts is most explicit in his The Principles of Psychology, though it can be found in earlier papers such as "The Sentiment of Rationality" and "The Function of Cognition" that fed in to that work. A general willingness to either accept the logical consequences of one&s;s beliefs, or to revise those beliefs, is viewed by many philosophers as inseparable from rationality, so it is not surprising that James&s;s &s;rejection of logic&s; in A Pluralistic Universe was viewed as perhaps the most flagrantly &s;irrational&s; strand in his philosophy, with passages like the following being met with incomprehension and disappointment by many of James&s;s contemporaries.