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Opaque models: Using drugs and dreams to explore the neurobiological basis of mental phenomena.

Nicolas Langlitz

Progress in Brain Research 2017 DOI: 10.1016/bs.pbr.2017.03.002 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Historical and ethnographic case studies; theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Dreaming
Keywords Consciousness Hallucinogens Models Psychedelics
Key findings Argues that opaque models, in which one partially understood phenomenon stands in for another, can generate funding and new research questions, but their opacity may limit the production of positive knowledge from the representational relationship. Bidirectional comparisons between inebriation, dreaming, and psychosis were generative at the level of basic science, and the models discussed implicated cosmologies that steered research in particular directions.

Abstract

On the basis of four historical and ethnographic case studies of modeling in neuroscience laboratories, this chapter introduces a distinction between transparent and opaque models. A transparent model is a simplified representation of a real world phenomenon. If it is not patently clear, it is at least much better comprehended than its objects of representation. An opaque model, by contrast, looks at one only partially understood phenomenon to stand in for another partially understood phenomenon. Here, the model is often just as complex as its target. Examples of such opaque models discussed in this chapter are the use of hallucinogen intoxication in humans and animals as well as the dreaming brain as models of psychosis as well as the dreaming brain as a model of consciousness in general. Several functions of opaque models are discussed, ranging from the generation of funding to the formulation of new research questions. While science studies scholars have often emphasized the epistemic fertility of failures of representation, the opacity of hallucinogen intoxications and dreams seems to have diminished the potential to produce positive knowledge from the representational relationship between the supposed models and their targets. Bidirectional comparisons between inebriation, dreaming, and psychosis, however, proved to be generative on the level of basic science. Moreover, the opaque models discussed in this chapter implicated cosmologies that steered research endeavors into certain directions rather than others.

Comparable studies

Other case reports and case series on dreaming, most cited first.

Study Year Design Participants
Lucid Dreaming as a Learnable Skill: A Case Study The author 1980 Case study n = 1
Lucid Dreaming as a Treatment for Recurrent Nightmares People with recurrent nightmares 2010 Case study n = 5
Treating Chronic Nightmares of Sexual Assault Survivors with an Intellectual Disability – Two Descriptive Case Studies Adults with learning disabilities suffering from post-traumatic nightmares 2006 Case study n = 2
Lucid dreaming: Correspondence between dreamed and actual events in one subject during rem sleep A lucid dreamer 1984 Case study n = 1
Lucid dreaming treatment for nightmares: A series of cases. Participants with nightmares 2003 Case series n = 8

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