Material constitution, the neuroscience of consciousness, and the temporality of experience
Benjamin L. Curtis
Advances in Consciousness Research June 17, 2015 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.92.19cur (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a completed neuroscience of consciousness must give synchronic and diachronic application conditions for brain states and phenomenal states, and that because experiences are temporal, these states should be viewed as temporally extended events. The author also raises difficulties for this project as challenges for further philosophical work. |
Abstract
Drawing upon material from my earlier chapter (with Noonan), in this paper I argue that if a completed neuroscience of consciousness is to be attained, we must give the synchronic and diachronic application conditions for brain states and phenomenal states. I argue that, due to the temporal nature of our experiences, such states must be viewed as being temporally extended events, and illustrate how to give such application conditions using examples of other temporally extended events. However, I also raise some difficulties for the project of giving application conditions for brain states and phenomenal states and suggest these as challenges for further philosophical work.
Citations in the library
Cites 3
- What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? The MIT Press eBooks October 25, 2002
- On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness. Acta Neuropsychiatrica June 1, 2007
- The Constitution of Visual Consciousness Advances in Consciousness Research August 28, 2013