What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.
Philosophia February 9, 2016 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9693-z (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Wittgenstein Qualia Metaphysical subject Epistemic position Resolute reading |
| Key points | Argues that Wittgenstein's concept of the metaphysical subject provides a new way to understand subjective qualities of experience, and concludes that "what is it like" primarily means "what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject." |
Abstract
I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that "what is it like" means primarily "what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject".