Embodied Concepts and Mental Health.
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine March 13, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhx040 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that while embodied cognition and "conceptual metaphor theory" are supported by some empirical evidence, CMT has limitations and unresolved philosophical problems, and suggests that embodied cognition may have implications for understanding and treating mental disorders. |
Abstract
Often drawing on the phenomenological tradition, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists working in the field of "embodied cognition" subscribe to the general view that cognition is grounded in aspects of its sensorimotor embodiment and should be comprehended as the result of a dynamic interaction of nonneural and neural processes. After a brief introduction, the paper critically engages Lakoff and Johnson's "conceptual metaphor theory" (CMT), and provides a review of recent empirical evidence that appears to support it. Subsequently, the paper underscores some of the limitations of CMT, points to some philosophical problems that require further attention, and explores possible implications for understanding and treating of mental disorders.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 6
- The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition Oxford University Press eBooks September 13, 2018
- Interpersonal judgments, embodied reasoning, and juridical legitimacy Oxford University Press eBooks October 9, 2018
- The Embodied Cognition Research Programme Philosophy Compass March 1, 2007
- Six views of embodied cognition 2002
- The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience 1991
and 1 more in the library