El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: extensión, corporización y enactivismo
Federico Gabriel Burdman
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology March 8, 2016 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p475 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that Rowlands's identification of post-cognitivism's theoretical nucleus with the convergence of extended and embodied mind theses is inadequate, and proposes that the tensions between functionalism and embodied/enactive approaches might be resolved by reconceiving post-cognitivism as non-functionalist, including divorcing the extended mind thesis from its functionalist origins. |
Abstract
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p475In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I will firs consider critically a proposal put forth by Rowlands (2010), which identifie the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I fin in this proposal will lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches. I will then discuss the standing of embodied, enactive and extended approaches in the face of the dividing issue concerning functionalism, with an eye on the possibility of divorcing the thesis of the extended mind of its original formulation in functionalist terms. In this way, I shall consider the outlook of overcoming some of the conceptual tensions in post-cognitivism by thinking its theoretical framework as non-functionalist.