On the Matter of Robot Minds
Brian P. McLaughlin, David Charles Rose
March 29, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Experimental philosophical study |
|---|---|
| Population | Laypeople (the folk) |
| Citations | 4 |
| Key findings | The author reports that laypeople largely reject the view that silicon-based robots with the same behavioral dispositions as biological beings would have the same conscious sensations. This challenges "nomological behaviorism," the idea that matching peripheral behavior dispositions is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract One reason it matters whether phenomenally conscious robots will soon be forthcoming is that such robots would have moral rights. The view that they are on the horizon often rests on a certain philosophical view about consciousness, one called “nomological behaviorism” in this chapter. The view entails that, as a matter of nomological necessity, if a robot had exactly the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as a phenomenally conscious being, then the robot would be phenomenally conscious. The chapter experimentally investigates whether the folk think that certain (hypothetical) robots made of silicon and steel would have the same conscious states as certain familiar biological beings with the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as the robots. The findings provide evidence that the folk largely reject the view that silicon-based robots would have the sensations that they, the folk, attribute to the biological beings in question.