M.I. Karinsky and F. Brentano: Commonality and Difference

Abstract

The article examines the concept of consciousness by M.I. Karinsky, a representative of the pre-phenomenological tradition in Russian philosophy in the second half of the 19th century. The author shows that in his program work “Phenomenon and Reality” Karinsky develops ideas comparable to the most important provisions of the book by the Austrian philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano “Psychology from an empirical point of view”, from which, as is commonly believed, phenomenological philosophy begins. Karinsky criticizes the view ac­cording to which a person can only know phenomena, but not external reality, he explains the possibility of such a view by the ambiguity of the word “phenomenon”. Firstly, a phenomenon is understood as that in which external reality appears through our senses; at the same time, our perception of external things is mistakenly identified with the things themselves. Secondly, phenomena denote our mental states, thoughts, feelings and emotions, which, unlike the first, are real regardless of what causes these states. Thirdly, the image of the “I” present in our consciousness, which we unreasonably equate with the carrier of external and internal perceptions, should be considered a phenomenon. The author of the article shows that the first two meanings of the concept of “phenomenon”correspond to Brentano’s physical and mental phenomena, and the third point corresponds to the possibility of constructing what Brentano calls “psychology without a soul”. He shows that the concept of intentionality developed by Brentano is comparable to Karinsky’s distinction between the represented object and the corresponding state experienced by the feeling subject (affeciya). However, unlike Brentano, Karinsky does not abstract from the bodily carriers of mental and physical phenomena, but believes that it is possible, starting from the immediate data, to proceed on the basis of scientific methods to the properties of these bodily carriers. At the same time, both agree that the properties of physical phenomena given to our perception do not coincide with the properties of external things. The article recognizes the ideological independence of the philosophers under consideration from each other, and the commonality of their views is explained by the fact that both start from the ideas of their philosophical predecessors and teachers Trendelenburg and Lotze.