Panpsychism and the Limits of Physical Science
A. Ney
Journal of Consciousness Studies 2021 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.28.9.181 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the instrumentalist and structuralist premises Goff uses to limit physical science are unmotivated and would not license his panpsychism, and that physicalism can account for free will, objective value, and meaning at least as well as panpsychism can. |
Abstract
This essay critically engages with two themes in Philip Goff's book Galileo's Error regarding, first, the limits to what we can learn from physical science and, second, the comparative metaphysical and ethical implications of panpsychism and physicalism. I argue that the instrumentalist and structuralist theses Goff uses to prop up his claims about the limits of physical science are unmotivated and, even if they were motivated, would not support the sort of panpsychism Goff recommends. The second part of the essay shows why physicalism is, contrary to Goff's claims, no worse than panpsychism when it comes to providing accounts of free will, objective value, and meaning.