A Brief Criticism of Theories
Paulo J. Negro
BENTHAM SCIENCE PUBLISHERS eBooks February 8, 2019 DOI: 10.2174/9781681087665119010007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Integrated Information Theory and Orchestrated Objective Reduction both fail to account for the subject and its agency, and that consciousness can only arise from a subject-object dialectic in which the subject exists a priori. Contends that integrated information is not a general cause of consciousness and that Orch-OR anthropomorphizes quantum information. |
Abstract
Two of the most popular theories that address the Hard Problem suggest that the minimal unit of consciousness could emerge from subcellular structures. Both theories neglect the importance of the subject and its agency. Both disregard the basic phenomenological definition of consciousness: there must be someone for someone to be conscious. According to the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), consciousness emanates from integrated information. The axioms at the basis of the IIT speak to the phenomenology of consciousness: consciousness exists, it is structured, it is informative, it is irreducible and it is unique or exclusive. However, the phenomenology of consciousness can only spring from the subject-object dialectic. Thus, the subject must exist a priori, as a premise, not as a conclusion. Integrated information does not provide a general cause of consciousness, but something implicit to it. The main IIT hypothesis is hopelessly flawed. A second popular theory, the Orchestrated Objective Reduction of quantum states postulates that a proto-element of consciousness accompanies any quantum reduction process. It anthropomorphizes quantum information.