Gurwitsch’s Field of Consciousness and Radical Embodied Cognitive Science: A Case of Mutual Enlightenment
G. Artese
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology September 14, 2021 DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1977091 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Gurwitsch's distinction between theme, thematic field, and margin can help radical embodied approaches methodically grasp how contextual and attentional factors modulate affordance perception. However, the author contends that Gurwitsch's placement of bodily awareness mostly in the margin creates theoretical problems in light of empirical evidence from situated cognition, suggesting his intuitions about bodily awareness need revision. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT This article tests the waters concerning a possible integration of Gurwitsch’s theory of consciousness into 4E research. More specifically, it is suggested that radical embodied approaches can benefit from Gurwitsch’s distinction between theme, thematic field and margin in order to methodically grasp how contextual and attentional factors can modulate affordance perception. On the other hand, Gurwitsch’s choice to locate the awareness of embodiment (most of the time) in the domain of the margin can generate important theoretical problems in light of empirical evidence often brought up by situated cognition researchers. Following Gallagher’s suggestion that phenomenology and cognitive science can enlighten each other, I argue that Gurwitsch’s notion of a field of consciousness can be an invaluable tool for research on affordances. Nonetheless, at the same time, the results of embodied cognitive science should lead us to revisit some of his intuitions regarding the role of bodily awareness.