Schlick, Carnap, and Feigl on the mind-body problem
T. Uebel, C. Limbeck
The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism November 23, 2021 DOI: 10.4324/9781315650647-28 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Schlick, Carnap, and Feigl all held some form of scientific physicalism about the mind-body problem, but a linguistic or conceptual rather than ontological physicalism, and that their views diverged and evolved, culminating in opposing positions between Carnap and Feigl. Their shared focus was sensations and sensory consciousness, or "raw feels" (qualia). |
Abstract
Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Herbert Feig are the most prominent of the positivists to formulate views on the mind-body problem. (C. G. Hempel’s one-off treatment [1935] is set aside here; see Kim [2003] and Crawford [2013].) While their views differed from each other and changed over time, they were all committed to some form of scientific physicalism, though a linguistic or conceptual rather than ontological form of it. In focus here are their views during the heyday of logical positivism and its immediate aftermath, though some initial scene-setting of Schlick’s and Carnap’s pre-positivist views will help to understand the final opposing positions of Carnap and Feigl. All three philosophers are largely—entirely, in the case of Schlick and Feigl—concerned with sensations and sensory consciousness, or what Feigl came to call (after the psychologist E. C. Tolman) “raw feels” and what are now usually called “qualia” or “phenomenally conscious” mental states.