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From Phenomenology to Phaneroscopy

Richard Kenneth Atkins

Oxford Scholarship Online October 18, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190887179.003.0005 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Historical analysis Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Peirce renamed phenomenology "phaneroscopy" in 1904 for terminological exactness, settling on "phaneron" and the "-scopy" suffix to mark the science as observational. Peirce's characterizations of the phaneron changed over time in response to four problems concerning possible versus actual consciousness, generalizing from one's own experience, clarifying the object of investigation, and speaking of the phaneron as a totality while referencing its parts.

Abstract

Peirce first recognizes a science of phenomenology in 1902, but in 1904 he changes the name of the science to phaneroscopy. This change is motivated by a desire for terminological exactness. After rejecting “phenomena,” “pure experience,” and “idea” as appropriate words for the object of phenomenological investigation, Peirce settles on “phaneron.” He changes the suffix from “-logy” to “-scopy” to indicate that the science is primarily observational. Peirce’s characterizations of the phaneron change over the course of his investigations because of four problems he faces. Those problems are whether the phenomenologist studies the possibilities of consciousness or actual consciousnesses, how we can generalize observations of our own conscious experiences to what any conscious experience is like, how we can make our conception of the object of phenomenological investigation clearer, and how we can speak of the phaneron as a totality and yet reference its parts.

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