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Opening a conceptual space for metamemory experience.

Joseph Neisser, George Abreu, Daniel L Drane, Nigel P. Pedersen, Thomas D Parsons, Anne M. Cleary

New Ideas in Psychology November 19, 2022 DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2022.100995 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Consciousness Concordance Metamemory Déjà vu
Key points Argues that metamemory feelings should be added as a fourth dimension to Rubin's three-dimensional model of memory states, and that this expanded model helps conceptualize a new category of memory state, "autonoetic knowing," exemplified by déjà vu. The authors caution against the "doctrine of concordance," the assumption that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content.

Abstract

The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance.

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