Postscript Consciousness Revisited
Don Garrett
Oxford Scholarship Online October 18, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195307771.003.0019 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Spinoza identifies consciousness with the power of thinking, and defends this reading against Nadler's complexity-based interpretation and LeBuffe's proposal to restrict it to the consciousness of ideas within a mind. |
Abstract
Chapter 14 (“Representation and Consciousness in Spinoza’s Naturalistic Theory of the Mind and Imagination”) argues that Spinoza identifies consciousness (conscientia) with power of thinking (cogitandi potentia). In his important article “Spinoza and Consciousness” (2008), Steven Nadler rejects this interpretation, proposing instead that consciousness for Spinoza is “a certain complexity in thinking that is the correlate of the complexity of a body.” In another important article, “Theories about Consciousness in Spinoza’s Ethics” (2010), Michael LeBuffe proposes that the interpretation of consciousness as power of thinking is “promising” but should be restricted to the consciousness of ideas within a mind and not applied to a mind’s overall consciousness. This postscript raises objections to Nadler’s complexity-based interpretation, rebuts Nadler’s objections to Chapter 14’s “Power of Thinking” interpretation, and argues against LeBuffe’s proposal to restrict the scope of that interpretation.