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En deçà de la tautologie symbolique du cogito Variations sur Descartes et Augustin à travers Levinas et Marion

István Fazakas

AUC INTERPRETATIONES January 10, 2022 DOI: 10.14712/24646504.2021.15 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that ipseity is made possible by a radical absence and alterity at its core, which prevents the self from fully possessing itself. Levinas's reading of Descartes and Marion's reading of Augustine both point to this immemorial dimension. The author asks whether phenomenology can describe this transcendence or must give way to ethics or theology.

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the thesis according to which ipseity cannot be conceived of without acknowledging a radical absence and alterity in its very core that makes it possible. To develop this thesis, I draw on Levinas’ reading of Descartes and Marion’s reading of Augustine. After a brief introductory part on what we could call, with Marc Richir’s term, the symbolic tautology of ipseity, I show how such a tautology is deconstructed by Levinas’ interpretation of the idea of the infinite in Descartes’ Third Meditation. I then proceed to contrast the results of this reading with Marion’s take on the problem of the memoria in Augustin’s Confessions. Both readings point towards a radical and immemorial dimension of absence that – by impeding the self from fully possessing itself – makes paradoxically ipseity possible in the first place. In the conclusion, I pose the question of whether – in order to account for this absence that reveals a transcendence in the most inner intimate of the self – one has to abandon phenomenology for ethics or some kind of new theology or if a strictly phenomenological description of this dimension of the experience of ipseity is possible.