Notion “Mental Content” in the Context of S. Hurley’s Enactivism
Fedor Alekseevich Stanzhevskiy
Manuscript February 10, 2021 DOI: 10.30853/mns200597 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the traditional conception of cognition as an interface between perception and action is inadequate because it ignores their interrelation, and that non-conceptual mental content is weaker in normativity than conceptual content. The author also claims a correlation between non-conceptual mental content and action intention, and analyzes mental content in relation to pre-linguistic consciousness. |
Abstract
The research objectives are as follows: to give an idea of Susan Hurley’s philosophy and to check whether the relevant philosophical problem of mental representation and mental content is non-contradictive. The article criticizes the traditional conception of consciousness, in which cognition is considered as an interface between perception and action, without taking into account interrelation of these processes. The problem of mental content is tackled; it is shown that normativity of non-conceptual mental content is weaker in comparison with conceptual one. Scientific originality of the study lies in the fact that the researcher introduces the name of the woman-philosopher S. Hurley, a figure of the English-language cognitive philosophy whose works are little known in Russia, into scientific use. The author clarifies the notion “mental content” and criticizes the modern cognitive theory. The research findings are as follows: correlation of non-conceptual mental content and action intention is revealed, the notion “mental content” is analysed in relation to pre-linguistic consciousness.