Consciousness and liability of non-human intelligence
Henrique Marcos
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito August 14, 2023 DOI: 10.4013/rechtd.2022.143.06 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the legal liability of a non-human intelligence hinges primarily on meeting "psychosomatic conditionals," which are partly determined by consciousness. Concludes that determining whether legal liability is desirable requires setting standards for non-human consciousness and judging liability according to the agent's level of consciousness. |
Abstract
The legal liability of non-human intelligence is a complicated matter that has concerned philosophers for a long time. Nevertheless, with the current advances in research and technology, the problem grows ever closer. This paper analyzes the legal desirability of assorting legal liability to a non-human intelligence. It argues that the question of the liability of such agents is defined, primarily, through the meeting of psychosomatic conditionals. Moreover, it poses that these conditionals are, partially, determined by consciousness. It concludes that to define whether legal liability is desirable or not one must set standards for non-human consciousness and, depending on the level of consciousness of that non-human intelligence, judge if the agent should be legally liable or not.