Human Consciousness and Artificial Minds: A New Challenge for Legal Personhood
Northon Salomao de Oliveira
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that law exhibits a "consciousness-attribution asymmetry": disorders-of-consciousness doctrine applies maximal diagnostic caution to avoid false negatives, while artificial-mind and animal-personhood law avoids the consciousness question through functional criteria, capacity tests, or guardianship. The author contends this pattern reflects differing institutional risk calculi rather than philosophical disagreement, and proposes "evidentiary-direction disclosure" as a procedural remedy. |
Abstract
Two bodies of law ask whether an entity possesses consciousness and answer through incompatible procedures. Disorders-of-consciousness doctrine demands maximal diagnostic caution, treating any residual uncertainty as a reason to maintain life-sustaining treatment due to the high moral cost of a false negative. Conversely, artificial-mind and animal-personhood law adopts a strategy of categorical avoidance, resolving personhood questions through functional criteria, capacity-based tests, or designated guardian structures without engaging the question of machine or animal experience. This article coins the term consciousness-attribution asymmetry to describe this pattern, arguing that it reflects distinct institutional risk calculi rather than conflicting philosophical views on consciousness. To address this tension without disrupting institutional functions, the article proposes a modest procedural remedy: evidentiary-direction disclosure, requiring courts and legislatures to state openly which evidentiary direction they apply and why.