Autonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory
André Sant’Anna, Kourken Michaelian, Nikola Andonovski
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science August 9, 2023 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1665 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that philosophical accounts of autonoetic consciousness fall into representational, metacognitive, and epistemic varieties, and that assessing these against immediacy and source criteria clarifies their relationship to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity. Contends that any adequate philosophical account of autonoesis should satisfy these criteria. |
Abstract
The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Philosophy > Consciousness Psychology > Memory.