Existential feelings and the feeling of pastness in episodic remembering
Róbson Ramos Dos Reis
Filosofia Unisinos September 15, 2026 DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2026.272.08 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes that existential feelings, via their pre-intentional function, constitute the intentionality and valence of the epistemic feelings involved in episodic remembering, and that context and experiences of possibility shape the pastness content of those feelings. Argues for a collaborative phenomenological-metacognitive framework and sketches an analysis of the horizon intentionality proper to the feeling of pastness. |
Abstract
In this paper, I propose a collaborative approach to analysing the phenomenal experience of episodic remembering, bringing together contemporary phenomenology of existential feelings with metacognitive approaches to the feeling of pastness. I explore the issue of how existential feelings, through their pre-intentional function, can constitute the intentionality and valence of the epistemic feelings involved in episodic remembering. I present (1) the main results of the phenomenological analysis of existential feelings, and (2) the outcomes from the metacognitive-affectivalist account on the feeling of pastness in episodic remembering. Then, I consider (3) the dependence relation between experiences of possibilities provided by existential feelings and the role of context in specifying the pastness content of the epistemic feeling involved in episodic remembering. Finally, I sketch (4) an analysis of the horizon intentionality proper to the feeling of pastness. I conclude presenting directions for future research into a phenomenology of episodic memory based on the elucidation of existential feelings.