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Prospects for Solving the Psychophysiological Problem: Brain Activity, the Mind, and Consciousness Phenomena

N.I. Chuprikova

Natural Systems of Mind March 30, 2026 DOI: 10.38098/nsom_2026_06_01_07 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Qualitative Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that the English "mind" is equivalent to the Russian "psyche," that Pavlov's "grand signalization of speech" distinguishes human from animal higher nervous activity, and that neuroscience should pursue physiological mechanisms rather than explain brain processes through vague constructs such as "consciousness" and "free will."

Abstract

On March 12, 2026, Natalia Ivanovna Chuprikova, Doctor of Psychology and Professor Emerita of the Psychological Institute of the Russian Academy of Education, passed away. She was a patriarch of Russian psychology, a preeminent scholar in the fields of psychophysiology, the theory of higher nervous activity, and developmental psychology. Her scientific legacy spanned an entire epoch in the development of Russian psychological thought. Chuprikova served as a crystallizing center of genuinely free scientific inquiry, distinguished by her independent scientific stance and her uncompromising commitment to the criteria of scientific rigor. Under her mentorship, a cohort of scientists emerged who, in their groundbreaking research grounded in the differentiation–integration principle of development, break down interdisciplinary barriers and, within a unified terminological framework, lay the foundation for a psychology of the new millennium. The key milestones of N.I. Chuprikova’s scientific legacy are presented in the second issue of the journal Natural Systems of Mind (2024, Volume 4, Issue 2) in the section “Learning from the past”. In this regard, the editorial board of the journal decided to publish in this issue excerpts from a letter from N.I. Chuprikova to K.V. Anokhin, which should be considered as a testament to scientists in the field of neuroscience – an uncompromising call for methodological rigor and a warning against replacing objective analysis with mythologized constructs of consciousness and free will. Brief Considerations on Some Theoretical Aspects of Neuroscience On the translation of the term mind. The English term mind is more adequately translated into Russian not as “reason” (razum) but as “psyche” (psikhika). In the English-language tradition, the concept of mind encompasses sensations, feelings, memory, thinking, intentions, desires, needs, as well as the conscious and the unconscious. In the Russian philosophical and psychological tradition, all these phenomena are denoted by the term “psyche.” The Russian word razum (“reason”) refers only to a subset of mental phenomena. Thus, in terms of content and scope, the English mind is equivalent to the Russian “psyche.” Accordingly, the mind-body problem and the mind-brain problem correspond in the Russian tradition to the psychophysical and psychophysiological problems, respectively. The hypernetwork and the representational-verbal system. The characteristics attributed to the hypernetwork pertain to the extensive representational-verbal system of humans. The presentation of the word “house” activates an infinite number of associations (my house, the neighbor’s house, the street, furniture, residents, parts of the house, etc.). This does not occur when simply viewing a picture of a house (unless the picture activates the verbal network). Animals either lack such an extensive representational-verbal system or possess only its rudimentary form. The qualitative difference of the human brain. According to I.P. Pavlov, the functioning of the human brain and its higher nervous activity qualitatively differ from those of animals due to the “grand signalization of speech” (Pavlov’s expression). Unfortunately, contemporary science does not always appreciate this difference. As the author has repeatedly noted (particularly in her latest book), the significance of Pavlov’s idea was understood only by L.S. Vygotsky. K.V. Anokhin’s “wormholes” metaphor and E.I. Boyko’s theory of dynamic temporary neural connections. With regard to the “wormholes” metaphor proposed by K.V. Anokhin, it is relevant to recall E.I. Boyko’s theory (1950s–1960s). Boyko postulated three types of excitation propagation via neural connections: unconditional, innate, permanent, genetically specified connections; temporary connections (Pavlovian), formed on the basis of the coincidence of excitation foci and underlying individually acquired behavior and learning; dynamic connections, which arise emergently without prior formation, as a result of the interaction of generalized “closure” connections (extraction of common elements, specialization of excitation). Boyko’s theory drew on I.M. Sechenov’s conception of thinking as mental comparison, J.S. Mill’s theory of inductive reasoning, and experimental data from Boyko’s own laboratory. Key works include Borderline Problems of Psychology and Psychophysiology (Boyko, 1961), Human Reaction Time (Boyko, 1964), and Mechanisms of Mental Activity (Boyko, 1976). This theory may serve as an important prerequisite for a general theory of brain function, and the “wormholes” metaphor may illustrate the spontaneous emergence of new pathways of excitation. Vygotsky’s assessment of Pavlov’s methodology and the current state of neuroscience. L.S. Vygotsky held Pavlov’s methodology for studying brain activity in high regard. Vygotsky considered the fine imposed by Pavlov in his laboratory for the use of psychological concepts to be a fact of no lesser significance than the dispute over the creed in the history of religion, because the fine targeted causeless, spaceless, indefinite, mythological thinking. Unfortunately, contemporary neuroscience exhibits an excess of such thinking. An example is B. Libet’s experiments: the subject receives a verbal instruction to voluntarily raise either the right or left hand. The task of science is to establish the physiological mechanisms by which this instruction is implemented, whereas theorists attempt to explain the nature of a complex objective brain process through even more vague concepts such as “consciousness” and “free will.” This exemplifies the substitution of objective analysis with subjective constructs. These considerations are offered to colleagues in the hope that they may prove useful for theoretical developments in neuroscience.