Beyond Self and No-Self: Reconstructing the Buddha’s Middle-Way Account of Selfhood in the Early Buddhist Nikāyas
Donghyun Yoon
Religions September 14, 2026 DOI: 10.3390/rel17091077 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Key points | Argues that the Buddha's silence before Vacchagotta is structural rather than suspensive or merely pedagogical, refusing the framework the question presupposes. Proposes that the four reasons given to Ānanda map onto four extremes, two mishandlings (absolutization and erasure) of each of two horizons: the phenomenal horizon as given and the unconditioned as itself. Introduces 'middle-way selfhood,' described as real yet non-substantial, with nibbāna as the horizon of its first-personal manifestation. |
Abstract
Asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta whether there is a self and whether there is no self, the Buddha was silent; he later gave Ānanda not two reasons but four, in two pairs, as to why. Scholarship divided between no-self and affirmative readings of anattā has claimed the episode for one side or the other without accounting for its fourfold form. This article locates the anattā teaching in the register of first-person experience, distinguishing two horizons: the phenomenal horizon as given, and the unconditioned (asaṅkhata) as itself. The contemplative procedure of the Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta shows how the second is disclosed against the first, with Husserl’s account of eidetic intuition supplying the vocabulary for the structural point. Each horizon admits exactly two mishandlings, absolutization and erasure, yielding four extremes through which the four reasons are best read. The four extremes share the assumption that a horizon can be taken on its own; the Buddha’s silence in response to Vacchagotta’s questioning is accordingly structural rather than suspensive or merely pedagogical, refusing the framework the question presupposes rather than withholding an answer. What the Buddha’s silence preserves is mutual co-presence: conditioned experience inhabited without appropriation and the unconditioned disclosed without being seized. This mode of mutual co-presence I call middle-way selfhood; on this view, it is real yet non-substantial, and nibbāna is the horizon of its first-personal manifestation.
In the evidence
This study is part of the evidence base for a synthesis in the library. Here is how each one recorded it.
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State of the evidence: Buddhism Unclear
Argues that the Buddha's silence before Vacchagotta is structural rather than suspensive, and proposes a middle-way selfhood that is real yet non-substantial, with nibbāna as the horizon of its first-personal manifestation.
Synthesized
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| Mental balance and well-being: Building bridges between Buddhism and Western psychology. | 2006 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
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| Buddhist and Psychological Perspectives on Emotions and Well-Being | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Too Early to Tell: The Potential Impact and Challenges—Ethical and Otherwise—Inherent in the Mainstreaming of Dharma in an Increasingly Dystopian World | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From self to nonself: The Nonself Theory | 2016 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 4
- Attention as a means of self‐dissolution and reformation Ratio September 28, 2018
- The Pleasure of Not Experiencing Anything: Some Reflections on Consciousness in the Context of the Early Buddhist Nikāyas Religions October 25, 2023
- Can Cessation Be a Cognitive State? Philosophical Implications of the Apophatic Teachings of the Early Buddhist Nikāyas Philosophy East and West July 1, 2023
- Rethinking the Buddha June 23, 2014