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A Neuroscientific Image of Human Beings Worth Standing Up For: The Nested Assumptions of 'You Are (Not) Your Brain'

P. Craffert

Journal of Consciousness Studies February 1, 2025 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.32.1.006 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that neurocentric views in consciousness neuroscience remain trapped in Cartesian dualisms, including mind-brain and brain-body dualism, and that physicalism coupled with idealism and scientism yields modern versions of the Cartesian image they seek to overcome. Proposes a humanistic, naturalistic alternative based on interactive realism, in which humans are complex embodied living systems whose wholes possess features not belonging to their parts, and reality is triply contingent on extra-mental reality and on how organisms collectively perceive it.

Abstract

Within the neuroscience of consciousness there are two incompatible views of human beings: you are your brain (neurocentric) and you are not your brain but you have a brain (humanistic). Neurocentric views are trapped in the Cartesian legacy of the mental– physical duality as well as the mind–body dualism that manifests in the mind–brain and brain–body dualisms. A version of physicalism coupled with idealism and scientism wraps these views into modern versions of the Cartesian image they seek to overcome. A humanistic view sees humans as living systems that consist of parts and wholes where the wholes obtain features that do not belong to the parts. As an alternative naturalistic image, it stands outside the dualistic thinking and Cartesian legacy and maintains that a human being is a complex embodied, physical thing. Based on interactive realism that accepts reality is triply contingent, it depends both on how extra-mental reality is and on how living organisms collectively perceive reality. The objective of this article is not to evaluate the merit of each view but a critical analysis of the frameworks that make each view possible.

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