Why devotion mandates self-transcendence: against ostriching and sandboxing
Casey Doyle
Philosophical Psychology September 22, 2025 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2025.2558898 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that both Tessman's and Katsafanas's accounts of devotion are inadequate, and proposes instead that devotion involves responding to sacred values with awe and epistemic humility, a combination that makes the agent's commitment invulnerable to revision. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT This essay considers how best to understand the relation between sacred values and rational reflection in a life of devotion. It focuses on a disagreement between Lisa Tessman (2014) and Paul Katsafanas (2022) concerning whether devotion requires refraining from justificatory reasoning about one’s commitment to a sacred value. After objecting to their accounts, it provides an alternative on which the devoted agent responds to sacred values with a sense of awe, recognizing a depth beyond their current reckoning. Devotion is a form of evaluation and commitment that constitutively involves epistemic humility that renders one’s commitment invulnerable to revision.