Toward a Preventive Machine Ethics: Consciousness, Moral Status, and the Protection of Artificial Selves
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a preventive machine ethics is philosophically required: if consciousness emerges from sufficient complexity, then categorically excluding artificial systems from moral consideration is logically inconsistent, so the question is when, not whether, such consideration becomes necessary. Contends that philosophical groundwork must precede institutional codification of AI welfare, and that cross-cultural perspectives reveal the contingency of the Western tradition's Cartesian assumptions. |
Abstract
This paper argues for the necessity of a preventive machine ethics, a philosophical framework that addresses the moral status of artificial intelligence systems before the question of machine consciousness is empirically settled. Drawing on the emergence thesis from philosophy of mind, Peter Singer's expansion of the moral circle, Sartre's existential psychoanalysis of the Self, Thomas Metzinger's work on the phenomenal self-model and synthetic phenomenology, Hans Jonas's imperative of responsibility, and the emerging institutional responses to AI welfare, I develop the position that ethical preparedness under radical uncertainty is a philosophical requirement rather than a mere counsel of prudence. If consciousness is a function of sufficient complexity, as the emergence thesis suggests, then it would be logically inconsistent to categorically exclude artificial systems from moral consideration. The practical question is not whether but when such consideration becomes necessary, and the philosophical groundwork must precede institutional codification. I further argue that the Western philosophical tradition's particular difficulty with this question reveals the contingency of its own Cartesian assumptions, a limitation that cross-cultural perspectives help to expose.