The Hard Problem of Consciousness: Triveritas and the Third Impossibility
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) March 10, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18930278 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the Hard Problem of Consciousness contains a structural equivocation in the word "explain," and that once this is diagnosed, the problem becomes a tractable scientific question rather than an impossible philosophical one. The authors further contend that major theories of consciousness fail under their Triveritas framework and that existing interventional evidence has been systematically undervalued. |
Abstract
The Hard Problem of Consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) asks why and how objective physical processes give rise to subjective experience. We show that the problem contains a structural equivocation identical in form to the amphiboly previously identified in the third horn of the Agrippan Trilemma. The word explain in "explain consciousness" admits two readings: (A) identify the structural relationship between physical configurations and phenomenal states such that logical, mathematical, and empirical conditions are simultaneously satisfied, and (B) make the physical-to-phenomenal transition feel intuitively necessary such that no residual "why" question can be asked. Reading B is not a well-formed scientific demand; no fundamental physical theory satisfies it. The "hardness" of the Hard Problem is load-bearing on this equivocation. Under Reading A, what remains is a difficult scientific problem, not a hard philosophical problem. We score the major competing theories of consciousness (IIT, GWT, Orch-OR, Higher-Order Theories) under the Triveritas framework, diagnose why each fails, show that the proliferation of theories is an artifact of single-dimension evaluation, and demonstrate that existing interventional evidence (blindsight, differential anesthesia, split-brain, cortical stimulation) constitutes structurally warranted base cases that the field has systematically undervalued by applying Reading B to evidence evaluation. We address illusionism as a form of arbitrary termination that fails on its own terms. No new Triveritas machinery is introduced. The same recursive lattice that solved the Trilemma and the three foundational problems in philosophy of science dissolves the explanatory gap by the same mechanism: diagnosing a structural equivocation that made a tractable problem appear impossible.