On the issue of altered states of consciousness from the perspective of the philosophy of law

Abstract

The article addresses the issue of altered states of consciousness from the perspective of the philosophy of law. In the 20th century, interest in human consciousness grew significantly. Alongside traditional issues, philosophers began to explore entirely new topics such as artificial intelligence, altered states of consciousness induced by new psychoactive substances, and other related questions. A major debate emerged in the philosophy of science between proponents of reductionism and emergentism. Reductionists argue that consciousness is inextricably linked to the brain and is its function, essentially equating consciousness with the brain. They reduce all manifestations of consciousness to the physiological processes of the nervous system. Emergentists, on the other hand, contend that complex systems cannot be reduced to the simple sum of their parts and that it is impossible to fully explain their functioning solely through the interactions of their components. Reductionism is traditionally applied in the natural sciences, while emergentism is used in the social sciences and humanities. However, the question arises as to which domain consciousness should belong to. The author examines the problem of altered states of consciousness from the perspectives of several relevant philosophical theories. The conclusion is made on the need for further theoretical development of the issue, as all psychoactive substances and similar compounds share a common effect—they can induce changes in the state of consciousness. If a unified approach to defining the criteria for these changes and methods for achieving them is developed, it would fully address the issue of new synthetic drugs.