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On the qualitative nature of conscious states: Insights from a structuralist theory of mind and meaning

Carles Salazar

Anthropology of Consciousness March 1, 2024 DOI: 10.1111/anoc.12221 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Penrose's notion of understanding as a non-algorithmic stimulus-response link can be explored by combining Tononi's Integrated Information Theory, which gives a quantitative measure of conscious states, with the structuralist theory of mind, in which meaning arises from qualitative contrasts among possible alternative actions. The author proposes that linking quantitative bits to qualitative binary oppositions does not resolve the hard problem of consciousness but may allow it to be reformulated productively.

Abstract

AbstractThe point of departure of this paper is Penrose's definition of conscious action as that in which stimulus and response are linked by a non‐algorithmic relationship, which Penrose defines as ‘understanding’. My purpose is to explore the nature of this understanding by means of a two‐step process. The first step is provided by Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. This theory provides us with a quantitative measure of conscious states that we need to transform into qualitative meaning. In the second step, we obtain this qualitative meaning with the help of the structuralist theory of mind. From this perspective, meaning originates in the set of qualitative contrasts that define the alternative courses of action that might have been implemented. Work on the analogy between quantitative bits and qualitative binary oppositions does not solve the hard problem of consciousness, but it might help to reformulate it in a new, productive way.

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