Toward an embodied cognitive science of religion: enaction, evolution, emergence
Religion, Brain & Behavior December 20, 2024 DOI: 10.1080/2153599x.2024.2378168 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Case report Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that reconstructing cognitive science of religion along enactive lines would give the field firmer scientific grounding and resolve long-standing debates. Proposes recasting agency detection as "embodied agency-attunement" so that sensitivity to agency can retain its foundational role while addressing empirical critiques. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT To secure the scientific credibility of its theoretical foundations, CSR needs to update its cognitive model. Seminal work in CSR, and much contemporary research, employs a model of cognition that is subject to mounting criticism (i.e., cognitivism). The most significant of these critiques come from 4E cognition. This paper focuses on enactive cognition, arguing that reconstructing CSR along the lines of enactivism will put the field on firmer scientific grounding and can resolve long standing debates within the field. Beginning with an in-depth critique of a key component of the cognitivist model, representationalism, the paper also argues that a non-representational enactive cognitive model fits better with the evolutionary commitments of CSR. Next, it considers a case study in an enactive reconstruction of CSR: agency detection. This foundational concept has come under scrutiny due to lack of empirical support, raising concerns that it may need to be abandoned. Enactivism recasts the concept as “embodied agency-attunement.” This allows a cognitive sensitivity to agency to continue its foundational role in CSR, while addressing empirical critiques leveled against it. The enactive approach is also compared to the predictive processing model. The paper concludes with suggestions about next steps towards an embodied CSR.