Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions
February 27, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197744208.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that beliefs are "self-verifying fictions": we make them up, but in making them up they come to exist, so the fiction of belief is true. The view is built from phenomenal intentionalism, a "self-ascriptivist" account of derived representation, and representationalism about the attitudes, and is contrasted with alternative accounts of belief and with other belief-like mental states. |
Abstract
Abstract In slogan form, the thesis of this chapter is that beliefs are self-verifying fictions: We make them up, but in so doing, they come to exist, and so the fiction of belief is in fact true. This picture of belief emerges from a combination of three independently motivated views: (1) a phenomenal intentionalist picture of intentionality, on which phenomenal consciousness is the basis of intentionality; (2) what I will call a “self-ascriptivist” picture of derived representation, on which non-fundamental representational features are a matter of our ascribing contents to ourselves or our mental states or contents; and (3) a representationalist picture of the attitudes, on which the attitude components of mental states (e.g., the “belief” bit of a belief that P) are represented contents. This chapter outlines and motivates the view of beliefs as self-verifying fictions, compares the view to alternative views of belief, and contrasts beliefs on the resulting picture to other belief-like mental states.