Reconceptualizing_Consciousness
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) March 4, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18867246 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 1 |
| Population | One adult subject observed over seven years |
| Duration | Seven years of observation |
| Key points | The authors propose that phenomenal consciousness (Type 1) is distinct from automated cognitive processing (Type 2), which they argue is what neuroscience usually studies. They claim Type 1 consciousness operates independently of Default Mode Network activity and enables direct perception without conceptual mediation, and that the hard problem of consciousness stems from conflating these two types. |
Abstract
This proposal presents a framework for understanding consciousness based onempirical observation of stable Type 1 consciousness in an adult subject over sevenyears. We propose that what neuroscience currently studies as ‘consciousness’ mayprimarily be automated cognitive processing (Type 2), while phenomenal awarenessitself (Type 1) operates through fundamentally different mechanisms. Key claimsinclude: phenomenal consciousness exists independently of Default Mode Network(DMN) activity; DMN-mediated cognition represents learned behavioral patterns ratherthan consciousness itself; the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ arises from studyingType 2 automation while seeking Type 1 phenomenality; and Type 1 consciousnessenables direct perception without conceptual mediation. This framework generatestestable predictions using neuroimaging, behavioral assessment, andphenomenological methods. We propose a multi-method research program combiningcase study analysis, comparative neuroscience, and experimental interventions tovalidate this model.