Bodily minded skill: active inference, flowing individuals, and the credit we owe them
Darius Parvizi-Wayne, Thomas Montefiore
Synthese March 12, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-026-05511-2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that flow is a bodily minded skill in which consciousness plays a central part, not a mindless state, and proposes a refinement of an axiological framework to account for subdoxastic intentions and desires, concluding that flowing individuals are just as intentional, agentive, skilful, and creditworthy as non-flowing counterparts who achieve the same material outcome. |
Abstract
Abstract The flow state has historically been a source of mystery and, at times, mysticism. Whereas some accounts of flow allude to the flowing individual’s conscious absorption and focus, others imply that the individual is, in fact, not conscious. If we take this latter model seriously, our intuition that those in flow ought to be creditable for their acts becomes deeply threatened. However, there is good reason to believe that this mindless account of flow is wrong. Recent work in theoretical cognitive science suggests that flow is an exhibition of bodily minded skill in which consciousness plays a central part. Although this account might salvage more creditability for the minded flowing individual than their mindless counterpart, under a recent axiological framework, it remains ambiguous just how creditable such minded individuals emerge, insofar as the taxonomy fails to cover the role played by subdoxastic intentions and desires in skilful activity. We thus propose a refinement of the framework, which accounts for how these flowing individuals are just as intentional, agentive, skilful, and thus creditable as any non-flowing counterpart who achieves the same material outcome.