Phenomenology of Birth: Selfhood, Horizon, and Anteriority
Research in Phenomenology May 12, 2026 DOI: 10.1163/15691640-12341596 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that birth, though inaccessible from the first-person perspective, should be understood as a horizon of one's past life, marked by anteriority rather than spontaneous beginning, such that the self is originally indebted to the others from whom it stems. |
Abstract
Abstract Being born is an undeniable fact of every human life, yet it seems that one’s birth evades any direct phenomenological access. Motivated by this problem, this article proceeds in three main steps. It first examines the problem of birth from the first-person perspective, where birth appears as both presupposed and inaccessible. The second step reverses the perspective by approaching pregnancy and birth from the standpoint of the mother, shifting the focus from the problem of access to the tension between unity and separation. Finally, the article proposes a third approach that retains the first-person perspective while also implying a constitutive reference to the mother. It argues that birth should be understood as a horizon of one’s past life. In this sense, birth is not conceived as a spontaneous beginning but is marked by anteriority, such that the self is originally indebted to the others from whom it stems.