Physicalism and Classical Theism
Peter Forrest, The Society Of Christian Philosophers
Faith and Philosophy 1996 DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199613227 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that reductive physicalism and classical theism share structural commitments: both require intuition-transcending identifications of properties or possibilities, both must identify psychological with functional properties, both confront a problem with consciousness, and both should distinguish fine- from coarse-grained theories of properties. |
Abstract
In this paper I compare two versions of non-eliminative physicalism (reductive physicalism and supervenience physicalism) with four of the five theses of classical theism: divine non-contingency, divine transcendence, divine simplicity, and the aseity thesis.I argue that: 1.Both physicalism (either version) and classical theism require intuitiontranscending identifications of some properties or possibilities.2. Among other identifications, both reductive physicalism and classical theism need to identify psychological with functional properties.3.Both reductive physicalism and classical theism have a problem with consciousness.4. Both reductive physicalists and classical theists should distinguish fine and coarse grained theories of properties.