Is Consciousness Sensational Inference?
Perception December 1, 1984 DOI: 10.1068/p130641 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Wittgenstein's discussion in Philosophical Investigations raises the problem of how we can meaningfully compare our own sensations with those of others, including animals, machines, or even 'conscious stones,' and questions whether it is meaningful to say a machine has sensations. The abstract references Wittgenstein's famous paragraph 293 argument but does not state it. |
Abstract
Is consciousness sensational inference? The Austrian Cambridge philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations (1953), gives a long, deep, fascinating discussion of sensation and whether it is possible for us to compare our sensations. He also asks whether it is meaningful for a machine to have sensations. The concern is over generalizing from one's own sensation to other people's—or to animals, or machines, or even more unlike us, to conscious stones. In Philosophical Investigations (I para 293) he states this famous argument: