Subjective Qualia from a Materialist Point of View
Paul M Churchland
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1984.2.192538 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that popular arguments claiming the qualitative features of sensations are permanently immune to materialistic neuroscience fail, and proposes that a successful psycho-physical reduction would not eliminate subjective experience but instead expand and transform human subjective consciousness as the brain's representational and computational strategies are revealed. |
Abstract
It is frequently argued that the phenomenological or qualitative features of our sensations will never be satisfactorily reduced by a purely materialistic neuroscience. They constitute, it is often said, a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of physlcalism. In what follows I provide a critical examination of several of the most popular of these arguments. I also explore the transformation and expansion of human subjective consciousness that a successful psycho-physical reduction could sustain. The conclusion is that, far from being Immune to neurophysiological explanation and reduction, the subjective qualities of our inner lives will enjoy a dramatic unfolding as the representational and computational strategies of the brain are revealed.