Churchland on Reduction, Qualia, and Introspection
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1984.2.192540 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that while people might learn to make quasi-introspective reports about neural phenomena such as dopamine levels and spiking frequencies, and this could benefit aesthetic appreciation and emotional self-understanding, such awareness would not constitute genuine introspective awareness, despite involving introspection in some sense. |
Abstract
Churchland (1985) is much struck with the possibility that we might learn to make introspective reports in “the conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience”. He thinks that this would yield “a quantum leap in self-apprehension”. And he apparently thinks that the possibility of this strengthens the case for reductionism. I will not question the claim that we might learn to make in a quasi-introspective way the sorts of reports Churchland envisages, about dopamine levels in the limbic system, spiking frequencies in neural pathways, and so forth; nor will I question that this might have a beneficial effect on our aesthetic appreciation, our emotional self-understanding, and the like. I will question whether the awareness Churchland envisages would be genuine introspective awareness, although in some sense it would involve it.